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Measuring Semantic Relatedness: 
A Proposal for a New Textual Tool 
 
Judicial decisions, statutes, constitutions, sentencing guidelines, and 
ERISA-related documents have at least one thing in common:  at a molecular 
level, the laws are all composed of words. The scientific study of linguistics, 
particularly the field of semantics, analyzes what words mean and how they are 
connected with each other. And yet, thus far, the legal field has taken little notice 
of academic and technological breakthroughs in the field of linguistic 
semantics. This Note seeks to highlight the potential utility of linguistic 
semantic tools in interpreting legal texts. Specifically, applying algorithms to a 
free online lexical database allows anyone with a computer to measure the level 
of relatedness between two nouns. Like more classical and widely accepted 
textual tools, these algorithms shed light on the plain meaning and semantic 
nuances of different words. Applying them to two prominent federal circuit 
splits regarding federal sentencing guidelines and ERISA benefits further 
underscores their usefulness across the legal discipline. The legal field stands 
to benefit from employing semantic linguistic algorithms in the law to help 
resolve semantic ambiguity in legal texts and arrive at more consistent, 
quantifiable conclusions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, when speaking of the legal profession, 
declared that “[a]ll our work, our whole life is a matter of semantics, 
because words are the tools with which we work, the materials out of 
which laws are made, out of which the Constitution was written. 
Everything depends on our understanding of them.”1 Courts’ reliance 
on textual tools to interpret legal texts further illustrates the 
importance of language and linguistics to legal analysis.2 And yet, thus 
far, the legal field has taken little notice of the linguistic study of 
semantics, which analyzes the meaning of words.3 In particular, 
semantic linguistics has developed such that anyone with a computer 
can now measure the semantic distance between two nouns (how 
similar two words may be) online for free.4 These online tools provide 
 
 1. WILLIAM T. COLEMAN & DONALD T. BLISS, COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION: SHAPING THE 
LAW TO REALIZE AMERICA’S PROMISE 78 (2010). 
 2. See infra Section I.A.   
 3. See Nicholas Johnson, Full Circle: General Semantics and the Law, 54 ETC 130,  
130 (1997). 
 4. See CHRISTIANE FELLBAUM, WORDNET: AN ELECTRONIC LEXICAL DATABASE 2 (2d  
prtg. 1999). 
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lawyers and judges the opportunity to use an unprecedented level of 
precision in analyzing legal texts and applying the facts to the law. 
This Note seeks to begin filling the gap between the legal field 
and the field of computational semantics. Part I provides background 
information on textual tools and the potential overlap with linguistics. 
It also explains the computational semantic linguistic tools (WordNet 
and the algorithms path, wup, and res) and illustrates how they can be 
used to compare different terms. Part II provides the legal support for 
using these tools by analogizing their justifications to those of more 
well-established linguistic and quantitative tools of statutory 
interpretation. Parts III and IV illustrate how useful these tools can be 
in legal interpretation by using them to resolve circuit splits in two case 
studies. The first circuit split, discussed in Part III, asks whether 
holding someone at gunpoint can qualify as “physically restraining” a 
victim under the federal sentencing guidelines. The second circuit split, 
in Part IV, discusses whether deaths caused by autoerotic asphyxiation 
may qualify as accidental deaths or deaths caused by self-inflicted 
injury for ERISA purposes. As the case studies show, the computational 
semantic linguistic tools are easy to use, well justified in legal 
interpretation, and extremely valuable in helping to resolve  
semantic ambiguity.  
I. TEXTUAL TOOLS AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 
In resolving semantic ambiguity, the law already substantially 
relies on textual tools to dissect, analyze, and interpret language. A 
semantic linguistic tool, WordNet, and associated algorithms can help 
shed light on semantic nuances behind individual words. Section A 
discusses the history of textual tools and linguistics and their potential 
intersection in the legal field. Section B explains the basic mechanics of 
how WordNet and semantic algorithms function.  
A. Finding Meaning: Textual Tools and Linguistics 
“[W]hat is chicken?” Judge Friendly famously asked in a seminal 
1960 case regarding contract interpretation.5 More than twenty years 
later, Justice Blackmun asked, “[W]hat does the Court mean by 
‘permanent’?”6 More recently, the Supreme Court asked, “What is a 
 
 5. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117  
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
 6. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 448 (1982) (Blackmun,  
J., dissenting). 
        
486 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2:483 
‘pole attachment’?”7 A primary job of judges and lawyers is to find the 
meaning of ordinary words written in legal texts to apply them to real-
life scenarios.  
Words and their meanings are therefore integral to the legal 
process.8 Meanings of words are so essential that the Supreme Court 
has set out a plain meaning rule: when the text of a statute is 
unambiguous, the inquiry starts and stops with the statutory text.9 
Therefore, sensibly, judges and lawyers start their analysis by 
determining the meaning of a legal authority.10 In doing so, legal 
practitioners turn to a variety of textual tools.11  
Textual tools identify the intrinsic meaning of terms or phrases 
and can encompass a wide variety of sources and canons.12 A classical 
tool of textual interpretation is the dictionary.13 Legal practitioners 
often use dictionaries to support or oppose a particular interpretation 
of a term.14 Specialty dictionaries, such as thesauri and etymology 
dictionaries, are also frequently used.15 Textual tools may also account 
for syntactic structure. For example, the last antecedent rule dictates 
that an explanatory clause or phrase should apply only to the noun or 
phrase immediately preceding it.16 
 
 7. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 300 (2013) (emphasis omitted). 
 8. See Editors’ Foreword, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 769 (1995). 
 9. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 631 (2018) (quoting BedRoc Ltd. v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)). 
 10. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey 
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1317 (2018): 
[B]oth the judges who start with the words of the statute and those who do not seem to 
us to engage in essentially the same mode of contextual analysis . . . . They begin by 
trying to understand the statute, the problem the statute addresses, and the issue in 
the case at a broad level of generality. This broad lens often seems necessary to 
understand what lengthy and complex modern statutes mean. 
But see id. at 1315–16 (refuting the notion that all judges start the process of interpretation by 
literally reading the whole statute itself). 
 11. E.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 719–21 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using dictionary definitions and the canons noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis to define the statutory meaning of “harm”). 
 12. See Stephen J. Safranek, Scalia’s Lament, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 315, 317 (2004). 
 13. As early as 1894, other law students grappled with the role dictionaries should play in 
legal analysis. William C. Anderson, Law Dictionaries, 28 AM. L. REV. 531, 535–36 (1894). 
 14. Compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998) (using dictionary 
definitions to argue that “carry” can include “conveyance in a vehicle”), with id. at 139–40 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using a dictionary definition to arrive at the opposite conclusion). 
 15. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (defining “commerce” using an 
etymology dictionary); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988) (using a 
thesaurus to define “willful”). 
 16. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27 (2003). 
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Textual tools have many possible legal justifications.17 First and 
foremost, textual tools can help orient legal practitioners to the 
meaning of a legal text.18 The meaning can illuminate how the enacting 
Congress would have resolved the issue at hand.19 Under the theory 
that courts are agents of the legislature, using textual tools helps 
legitimize judicial decisions and “promote fidelity” to Congress.20 
Conformity to the “rules” imposed by textual tools also increases 
predictability of judicial interpretation.21 This predictability further 
serves as a guidepost to the legislature about how courts will implement 
legislated acts.22 Although academic discussion of textual tools 
increased with the rise of new textualism in the 1990s, largely under 
the influence of Justice Antonin Scalia,23 legal practitioners of all 
interpretive theories employ textual tools at least as a component of 
their legal analysis.24 
The study of linguistics is highly relevant to legal analysis and 
the field of textual tools. Many textual tools are in fact derived from 
principles of linguistics.25 Linguistics, a field of study which predates 
Scalia’s textualism by several millennia,26 studies the science behind 
human communication, including subfields such as phonology (the 
physics of how humans produce sounds), morphology (the building 
blocks of how words are made), syntax (grammar), and sociolinguistics 
(how socioeconomic factors affect speech).27 Perhaps most importantly 
to the legal profession, the study of linguistics also includes semantics—
the study of what words mean.28 
In 1995, a handful of legal academics at a symposium hosted by 
Northwestern University and Washington University flirted with the 
idea of adding linguistics to their legal analysis.29 For example, 
 
 17. For justifications behind individual textual tools, see infra Part III. 
 18. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 454 (1989).  
 19. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533 (1983). 
 20. See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 415, 425. 
 21. See id. at 441–42. 
 22. See id. at 456. 
 23. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990). 
 24. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Remarks, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of 
Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 308 (2017). 
 25. See infra Section II.A.  
 26. See RICHARD HUDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO WORD GRAMMAR 103 (2010). 
 27. See Judith N. Levi, Introduction: “What Is Meaning in a Legal Text?” A First Dialogue for 
Law and Linguistics, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 771, 772 (1995).  
 28. See id. 
 29. See Editors’ Foreword, supra note 8, at 770 (“[The conference] represented the first 
significant interdisciplinary dialogue among scholars of law and linguistics and addressed itself to 
a central question: What is meaning in a legal text?”). 
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Professor Clark Cunningham, a professor of law, collaborated with 
Professor Charles Fillmore, a professor of linguistics, to analyze the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of what it means to “use a firearm.”30 
Professor Lawrence Solan contended that linguistics may be useful in 
cases where the statute is hard to read or the court must apply real-life 
scenarios to the statute.31 While Professor Robert Rasmussen found 
statutes on the whole too complex for linguistic analysis, he conceded 
that linguistics may be especially helpful in criminal law, where the 
goal is to understand the statutory language as an ordinary person 
would.32 In contrast, Professor Dennis Patterson dismissed the 
application of linguistics to legal texts as “nonsensical.”33  
Since the symposium, linguistics expanded to include the 
subfield of computational linguistics, which can involve mapping 
language into computationally tractable implementations of syntactic 
and semantic analysis.34 In short, semantic analysis is now easier and 
more advanced with the advent and ubiquity of computers.35 
Computational linguistics has been crucial to the development of 
linguistic technologies such as Siri and Google Translate, to name a few. 
The use of computational linguistics in the legal field has been 
both sparse and controversial. For example, Justice Lee on the Utah 
Supreme Court used linguistic tools to settle a question of statutory 
interpretation regarding the phrase “discharge of a firearm.”36 He then 
delivered an impassioned justification of using linguistic research in his 
analysis, arguing that linguistics can help decode language37 and that 
computational linguistic tools are transparent and easy to use.38 
Nonetheless, his fellow justices dismissed his findings as “scientific 
research” outside of the realm of judging.39 The 2017 Brigham Young 
University Law Review symposium on linguistics in the law played out 
similarly to the symposium in 1995. For example, Professor Stefan Th. 
Gries and Professor Brian G. Slocum’s suggestion that computational 
 
 30. Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic 
Perspective on Judicial Interpretations of “Use a Firearm,” 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1160 (1995). 
 31. Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis: Is There a Linguist in the 
Court?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1069, 1072 (1995). 
 32. Robert K. Rasmussen, Why Linguistics?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1047, 1053–55 (1995). 
 33. Dennis Patterson, Against a Theory of Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1153, 1153 (1995). 
 34. See Lenhart Schubert, Computational Linguistics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-
linguistics/ [https://perma.cc/ZL9T-3AY3] (giving a broad overview of computational linguistics). 
 35. See FELLBAUM, supra note 4, at 2. 
 36. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 80–96, 356 P.3d 1258, 1281–82 (Lee, J., concurring). 
 37. Id. at ¶¶ 58–63, 356 P.3d at 1276. 
 38. Id. at ¶¶ 80–88, 356 P.3d at 1281. 
 39. Id. at ¶¶ 17–20, 356 P.3d at 1265. 
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linguistics should be used to ascertain ordinary meaning40 garnered 
criticism that linguistics’ appeal was “superficial” and raised issues of 
notice and accountability.41 
In summary, there is a difference between the way that most 
judges and lawyers analyze the meanings of words and the way that 
linguists and scientists analyze the meanings of words. While the quest 
for the meaning of words underpins all legal analysis, legal academia 
and judicial review have so far largely failed to exploit important 
principles of linguistic semantics. But recent developments in linguistic 
semantics, particularly computational linguistics, are rife with 
opportunity for the legal field. 
B. New Linguistic Tools 
One particular tool, WordNet, has caused a revolution in the 
field of computational linguistic analysis of semantics.42 WordNet is 
free, easy to use, and operates much like conducting an internet 
search.43 Princeton University operates WordNet mostly through its 
Department of Computer Science.44 Anyone can apply algorithms to 
WordNet’s database for free to measure and quantify how two terms 
may be semantically related—namely, how two terms’ meanings relate 
or connect to each other.45 Measuring semantic relatedness is especially 
valuable in legal interpretation, where judges must categorically apply 
facts to legal language and decide whether the terms match. This 
Section explores and explains how WordNet functions as a lexical 
database and allows for computation of three algorithms—path,  
wup, and res—that can quantify the semantic relatedness between  
two nouns. 
1. WordNet as a Lexical Database 
WordNet is a web tool and app developed by Princeton 
University that serves as a large lexical database or taxonomy.46 
 
 40. Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017 
BYU L. REV. 1417, 1418–19 (2017). 
 41. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 
1503, 1504–05 (2017). 
 42. FELLBAUM, supra note 4, at 12–17 (listing research projects and improvements in 
computational linguistics using WordNet as a database). 
 43. What Is WordNet?, WORDNET, https://wordnet.princeton.edu (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/SD7C-76Q3]. 
 44. People, WORDNET, https://wordnet.princeton.edu/people (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/CY6B-MSGP]. 
 45. See, e.g., FELLBAUM, supra note 4, at 14–16. 
 46. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43. 
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WordNet has many functions, including as a regular dictionary. 
Professional lexicographers write the definitions associated with each 
term, calling the different definitions “senses” and denoting different 
parts of speech.47 Thus far in the legal world, WordNet’s use has mainly 
been confined to this dictionary function.48 WordNet also functions as a 
thesaurus, grouping senses that are synonymous with each other 
together in data sets called “synsets.”49 Distinct from a dictionary or 
thesaurus, however, WordNet assigns each separate sense of a word a 
numerical value based on the frequency at which that sense was used 
in language data that has been tagged by semantic linguists.50 
Additionally, WordNet tracks super-subordinate relationships, 
also known as ISA relationships.51 ISA relationships denote hypernyms 
and hyponyms.52 A hypernym is a “word whose meaning includes a 
group of other words.”53 For example, “furniture” is a hypernym of 
“chair” because “furniture” encompasses groups of other words like 
“chair,” “sofa,” and “bed.” Similarly, “animal” is a hypernym of “dog” and 
“rabbit.” Conversely, a hyponym is “a word whose meaning is included 
in the meaning of another word.”54 Therefore, “chair” is a hyponym of 
“furniture,” and “dog” is a hyponym of “animal.”   
WordNet has several other functions that are not as relevant to 
this Note’s analysis, such as tracking how one noun may constitute a 
part of another (meronymy), how specifically a verb describes an event 
(troponymy), and how adjectives may oppose each other (antonymy).55 
Although these functions may be useful for other analyses, they are 
outside the scope of this Note. 
As a free tool whose taxonomy can be easily downloaded and 
used for other computational programs, WordNet has inspired a wave 
of research and breakthroughs in computational semantics language 
processing.56 For example, the web app Word Similarity for Java 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., Johnson v. Portz, 707 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (D. Del. 2010); Robertson v. Health 
Net of Cal., Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (casting skepticism on the source). 
 49. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43. 
 50. Frequently Asked Questions, WORDNET, https://wordnet.princeton.edu/frequently-asked-
questions (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6AYP-XZ93].  
 51. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43. The phrase ISA literally means is-a; for example, a 
poodle is a dog. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Hypernym, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ 
english/hypernym (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/N8CP-58TT]. 
 54. Hyponym, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ 
english/hyponym (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4UDE-59JM]. 
 55. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43. 
 56. Related Projects, WORDNET, https://wordnet.princeton.edu/related-projects (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V33J-PXQ2]. 
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(“WS4J”) measures the semantic relatedness of words, using WordNet 
as a database and employing algorithms based on the research of 
various linguistic scholars.57 For the sake of explanation, the following 
sections explore these algorithms by testing how similar a “button”58 is 
to a “coin.”59 The resulting data would be meaningless without context 
of how similar other terms may be. Therefore, as a null variable, the 
following sections also measure the semantic distance between 
“nickel”60 and “coin.” Obviously, the human expectation is that “nickel” 
and “coin” should be more closely semantically related than “button” 
and “coin.” Regardless, if an alien were dropped on earth with just 
WordNet, these algorithms, and the knowledge that humans might pay 
for gumballs with coins, how would he know which round metal pieces—
nickels or buttons—to use? WordNet and the algorithms path, wup, and 
res would help him figure out how to buy a gumball.  
2. Measuring Blunt Distance with Path 
Each sense of a term is a “node” in the giant web of words that 
WordNet provides. A simple algorithm, path, measures semantic 
relatedness by finding the shortest path among the nodes of ISA 
relationships between senses.61 The first step is to find the Least 
Common Subsumer (“LCS”) between two nodes. The LCS is a hypernym 
that encompasses two nodes.62 For example, the LCS of “button” and 
“coin” is “entity” because both buttons and coins are types of entities.63 
 
 57. WS4J DEMO, http://ws4jdemo.appspot.com/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/J6FP-TVFZ]. 
 58. This analysis uses the first sense of “button,” meaning “a round fastener sewn to shirts 
and coats.” [Button], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=button&sub= 
Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h=000 (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6QN5-XFQZ]. 
 59. This analysis uses the nominal sense of “coin,” defined as “a flat metal piece (usually a 
disc) used as money.” [Coin], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=coin& 
sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h=0000 (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M3HN-4RS4]. 
 60. The definition used is a “United States coin worth one-twentieth of a dollar.” [Nickel], 
WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=nickel&sub=Search+WordNet&o2= 
&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h= (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/JN2F-V673]. 
 61. Linguists generally acknowledge this algorithm as emanating from the work of Roy Rada 
& Ellen Bicknell, Ranking Documents with a Thesaurus, 40 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. 304, 305 
(1989). See, e.g., CHAOMEI CHEN & MIN SONG, REPRESENTING SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: THE ROLE 
OF UNCERTAINTY 152 (2017). 
 62. This concept is analogous to finding the least common denominator between fractions. 
 63. [Button#n#1, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, http://ws4jdemo.appspot.com/?mode=w&s1=&w1 
=button%23n%231&s2=&w2=coin%23n%231 (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FFH8-
QKLK]. 
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There is no more specific LCS in WordNet’s taxonomy.64 In contrast, the 
LCS of “nickel” and “coin” is “coin” because “nickel” is a hyponym of 
“coin.”65 Once the LCS is determined, the algorithm path counts the 
number of nodes between the two senses at issue. The shortest path 
between “button” and “coin” requires traveling eighteen nodes in the 
ISA relationship.66 Because 1/18 is approximately 0.06, the result of 
path(button, coin) is 0.06.67 In contrast, path(nickel, coin) requires 
traveling only two nodes, leading to a value of 0.5.68 Figure 1 below 






 64. Id. 
 65. [Nickel#n#2, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, http://ws4jdemo.appspot.com/?mode=w&s1=&w1= 
nickel%23n%232&s2=&w2=coin%23n%231 (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/J3NC-
PRB8]. 
 66. [Button#n#1, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 63. 
 67. Id. 
 68. [Nickel#n#2, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 65. 
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3. Quantifying Taxonomic Depth with Wup 
Several algorithms complicate path by accounting for additional 
variables. For example, the algorithm wup also measures how many 
nodes are required to go from the most generalized hypernym in the 
taxonomy to the two terms at issue and the LCS.69 This distance is 
called taxonomic depth. For example, “entity” has a taxonomic depth of 
2: there is no hypernym for “entity,” so wup counts the database as a 
whole and the node “entity.”70 In contrast, “coin” has a taxonomic depth 
of 10, as there are eight nodes between “coin” and the database.71 The 
terms “nickel” and “button” each have a taxonomic depth of 11 because 








Once the algorithm wup calculates the taxonomic depth of the 
LCS and the two terms at issue, it divides the depth of the LCS by the 
sum of the taxonomic depth of the two terms at issue according to the 
formula (2 x Depth_LCS) / (Depth_term1 + Depth_term2). This formula 
acknowledges that if the terms at issue and the LCS are all deep into 
the taxonomy, the terms are more specific and therefore more closely 
related, causing wup to yield a higher fraction. For example, 
 
 69. See Zhibiao Wu & Martha Palmer, Verb Semantics and Lexical Selection, 1994 PROC. 32D 
ANN. MEETING ON ASS’N FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 133, 137. 
 70. [Button#n#1, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 63. 
 71. Id. 
 72. [Nickel#n#2, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 65. 
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wup(nickel, coin) yields a value of 0.95.73 In contrast, if the LCS is 
rather abstract and therefore shallow in the taxonomy, while the terms 
at issue are deep into taxonomy, wup will yield a smaller fraction.74 The 
value of wup(button, coin) is 0.19.75 Therefore, the higher the outcome 
of wup, the higher the level of correlation between the two terms. 
4. Considering Information Content with Res 
Conversely, the algorithm res considers how many nodes fall 
below a given term.76 This measurement is called information content.77 
For example, although “metal” and “chemical element” share the same 
taxonomic depth, “chemical element” contains more hyponyms than 
“metal” does.78 Thus, when two terms share the LCS “metal,” they will 
have higher information content than when two terms share only the 
LCS “chemical element.”79 This concept is illustrated in Figure 3, below. 
The algorithm res accounts for information content by measuring the 
information content of the LCS relative to the size of the entire 
taxonomy.80 Similar to wup, the less abstract and more specific the LCS, 

















 73. Id. 
 74. See Wu & Palmer, supra note 69, at 137. 
 75. [Button#n#1, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 63. 
 76. See Philip Resnik, Using Information Content to Evaluate Semantic Similarity in a 
Taxonomy, 1 PROC. 14TH INT’L JOINT CONF. ON A.I. 448, 451–52 (1995). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
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This discussion demonstrates there are several linguistic 
algorithms available that measure and quantify hierarchical 
relationships in semantics. Research has shown a strong correlation 
between the results of the algorithms and how humans perceive words 
semantically.85 These algorithms consider overall distance (path), 
taxonomic depth (wup), and information content (res). Path, wup, and 
res are not the only linguistic algorithms available, but they provide a 
useful starting point in helping to determine whether one term can be 
categorized as another—a crucial determination in legal analysis.  
II. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WORDNET AND THE ALGORITHMS 
In many ways, computational linguistic tools may serve the 
same function as traditional textual tools. As discussed in Section I.A, 
a primary and uncontroversial purpose of employing textual tools is to 
elicit meaning.86 Similarly, textual tools based on syntax illustrate 
widely held, common-sense patterns of thinking in language and 
communication.87 The algorithms serve all these functions: they elicit 
meaning by illustrating hierarchical relationships and semantic 
similarity of words, and they elucidate the cognitive classifications 
humans have of words in a wholly objective, quantifiable manner. 
Furthermore, the tools gain legitimacy through their close 
relationship to other more well-established tools of legal analysis. As 
tools of modern computational linguistics, WordNet and the algorithms 
discussed above are analogous both to linguistic tools that have already 
gained widespread acceptance in courts and to more modern, 
quantitative tools that have increased in popularity in recent years. 
This Section describes the justifications behind both classic linguistic 
tools and recent quantitative tools and demonstrates that those 
justifications similarly apply to WordNet and the algorithms path, wup, 
and res. 
 
 85. For example, res has a correlation of r=0.79 with human experiments. See CHEN & SONG, 
supra note 61, at 151. 
 86. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 18, at 454. 
 87. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment 
on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory 
Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 688 (1992). 
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A. Analogy to Other Linguistic Tools 
Although courts use many classical linguistic tools in statutory 
interpretation,88 three textual tools are particularly salient in justifying 
also using WordNet and the algorithms: dictionaries, etymology, and 
the last antecedent rule. This Section compares WordNet to dictionaries 
and the algorithms to etymology and the last antecedent rule. 
Dictionaries, etymology, and the last antecedent rule stem from 
classical linguistic principles,89 and all three tools are frequently 
employed in legal analysis.90 The justifications for these tools—
identifying semantic nuances and providing definitive, unbiased 
clarity—also apply to WordNet and associated algorithms. 
1. Dictionaries 
Judges often use dictionaries as a principal textual tool.91 
Lexicographers draft dictionaries based on linguistic surveys of usage 
and the underlying goal of descriptivism, not prescriptivism.92 For 
example, Webster’s Third Dictionary’s 1936 definitions were based on 
the editorial staff’s collection of 4.5 billion new usages of words from 
excerpts of books, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, catalogs, and 
journals.93 There are many potential justifications for using dictionaries 
as textual tools. First and foremost, dictionaries conveniently describe 
the usage and meaning of words, giving full effect to the language of the 
legal text.94 Indeed, using a dictionary to interpret legal language seems 
so obvious that “[n]o defense seems necessary.”95 
WordNet as a lexical database functions much like a dictionary 
and shares many of the same legal justifications.96 As previously 
 
 88. For example, Professor Solan explains that judges act as linguists when interpreting 
pronouns, the difference between “and” and “or,” and defining adjectives. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, 
THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 38–59 (1993). 
 89. See, e.g., LYLE CAMPBELL, HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (2013); Solan, 
supra note 31, at 31. 
 90. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27 (2003); Muscarello v. United States, 524 
U.S. 125, 128 (1998); John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court 
and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484, 497 (2014). 
 91. See Calhoun, supra note 90, at 497. 
 92. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 4a–5a (1993) (“Accuracy in 
addition to requiring freedom from error and conformity to truth requires a dictionary to state 
meanings in which words are in fact used, not to give editorial opinion on what their meanings 
should be.”). 
 93. Id. at 4a.  
 94. See Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 
2197 (2003). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra Section I.B.  
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discussed, WordNet data is objectively gathered, quantified, and tagged 
based on real and common usage by neutral linguists.97 The data 
gathered conveniently describes the usage and meaning of words,98 
thereby giving full effect to legal text. While using WordNet to define 
terms may not be as obvious to courts as using a dictionary,99 WordNet’s 
utility and intricacies speak for themselves, as WordNet enables 
computational analysis for semantic relatedness of terms.100 
2. Etymology 
Etymology is a byproduct of historical linguistics (a field of 
linguistic study examining how languages evolve over time) that serves 
as another classical textual tool.101 In Muscarello v. United States, 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, illustrated that the word “carry” 
can mean “carry in a car” in part because the Latin root of “carry” 
shared the meaning of transportation by vehicle.102 Justice Thomas, in 
his interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, also 
relied on the etymology of “commerce” in explaining that “commerce” 
can mean “with merchandise.”103 In fact, the Supreme Court’s use of 
etymology as an interpretive tool dates at least as far back as the 
1800s.104 The practice of using etymology to define and describe legal 
terms may have its roots in Plato’s works.105 
Explicit justifications for the Court’s use of etymology are 
sparse.106 At its most basic, etymology can help divine the meaning of 
 
 97. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., Robertson v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005) (deriding WordNet as an “internet dictionary” and “on-line lexical database” in comparison 
to “the venerable Oxford English Dictionary”). 
 100. See infra Parts III and IV.  
 101. See CAMPBELL, supra note 89, at 5. 
 102. 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998).  
 103. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 104. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 476 (1857); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 
How.) 283, 500–01 (1849); Patapsco Ins. v. Coulter, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 222, 230 (1830); United States 
v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 106 (1820). 
 105. See James Williams, Legal Etymology, 328 LAW MAG. & REV. 257, 257 (1903). 
 106. It is this author’s opinion that the use of etymology in statutory interpretation is not 
justified. Just like the sounds in words change over time, the meaning of words change over time 
through processes such as broadening, narrowing, metaphor, amelioration, taboo replacement, and 
pejoration. See CAMPBELL, supra note 89, at 223–25, 227–29 (overview of semantic and lexical 
change); Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and 
the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1640 (2017) (“Because semantics, syntax, and 
punctuation change over time, contemporary linguistic intuitions are not a reliable guide to the 
meaning of older texts.”); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional 
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1939–41 (2010) 
(explaining that accepting a given meaning as valid due to etymology alone would lead to absurd 
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particular antiquated or “fancy” words.107 In its more frequent legal use, 
however, courts employ etymology to elucidate the meaning of a term.108 
The study of etymology shows how and when a word originated through 
its form and meaning.109 Therefore, judges who use etymology presume 
that although the sounds and spelling of a word have changed over 
time, the word retains at least a connotation of its historical meaning. 
Etymology therefore aids judges in ascertaining the semantic nuances 
of words. 
Similarly, the algorithms quantify hierarchical relationships 
and therefore the interrelatedness of terms.110 The results of employing 
the algorithms reveal a level of interconnectedness that correlates to 
cognitive perceptions of how related two words may be.111 Accordingly, 
like etymology, the algorithms can help elucidate semantic nuances of 
words that are not evident from their current dictionary definitions. 
3. The Last Antecedent Rule 
There are also many parallels between the algorithms and the 
last antecedent rule. The last antecedent rule aligns with the cognitive 
linguistic principle of “late closure,” which indicates that humans tend 
to associate the newest words we process with the words we have 
processed most recently.112 Under the last antecedent rule, a clause or 
phrase should apply only to the noun or phrase immediately preceding 
it. In an example provided by Justice Scalia, if parents going out of town 
tell their teenager not to “throw a party or engage in any other activity 
that damages the house,” the parents can still punish the teenager for 
throwing a party that does not cause damage.113 In this colorful 
example, the last antecedent rule dictates that the phrase “that 
damages the house” applies only to the phrase “engage in any other 
 
results). Further critique of etymology as a tool of statutory interpretation is outside the scope of 
this paper, but this author believes that if judges can somehow justify using etymology in statutory 
interpretation, WordNet and subsequent algorithms are also justifiable. 
 107. See Williams, supra note 105, at 267. 
 108. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998). 
 109. See Robert Mailhammer, Introduction: Etymology Beyond Word Histories to LEXICAL AND 
STRUCTURAL ETYMOLOGY: BEYOND WORD HISTORIES 2 (Robert Mailhammer ed., 2013). 
 110. See supra Section I.B.   
 111. See CHEN & SONG, supra note 61, at 149. 
 112. See SOLAN, supra note 88, at 31–32. 
 113. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27 (2003). 
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activity.”114 Although judges have recently increased their usage of the 
last antecedent rule, use of the rule goes as far back as at least 1799.115  
Although the last antecedent rule garners a substantial amount 
of critique,116 it boasts several potential justifications. First, the rule 
acknowledges inherent ambiguities in the English language and 
attempts to resolve them decisively.117 Additionally, the last antecedent 
rule provides evidence of the “common sense” meanings of certain 
phrases.118 Furthermore, employing the last antecedent rule to all legal 
texts shows a lack of ideological bias, as the text may thereafter read to 
align with more liberal or more conservative values.119 
These same justifications support use of the algorithms. For 
example, the algorithms acknowledge that there are hierarchical 
structures to words in the English language and seek to quantify them 
definitively.120 In addition, the algorithms elucidate cognitive 
perceptions of what words mean and how they are related, which can 
help shed light on how common people understand the words.121 
Moreover, the algorithms are politically and ideologically neutral.  
WordNet and the algorithms therefore have many of the same 
justifications as more widely accepted linguistic textual tools. WordNet 
and the algorithms objectively account for linguistic realities, elucidate 
meanings of terms, highlight semantic nuances, and acknowledge 
structural relationships. 
B. Analogy to Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Quantitative Tool 
The algorithms also share common justifications with the 
quantitative textual tool, cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is 
 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Jeremy L. Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent 
in the United States Supreme Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 325, 327, 336 (2009). 
 116. See, e.g., Joseph Kimble, The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, the Example in Barnhart, 
Why Both Are Weak, and How Textualism Postures, 16 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 5, 5 (2015) (“A 
court that resolved this ambiguity by applying the doctrine (or rule, or canon) of the last antecedent 
would be a court that’s at a loss. And a court that uses it to support a decision made for other 
reasons is throwing in a feather.”); Ross, supra note 115, at 326 (“Two recent Supreme Court 
decisions have revealed that the decision to apply the Rule may be less a matter of common sense 
than nonsensical statutory construction.”). 
 117. See Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous 
Modifiers, 2 LEGAL WRITING 81, 85 (1996). 
 118. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 443 (2020). 
 119. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
849, 887 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (“Textualism could be used by liberals to equal (albeit 
opposite) effect . . . .”). 
 120. See Wu & Palmer, supra note 69, at 136. 
 121. See What Is WordNet?, supra note 43. 
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a tool that agencies use when deciding whether or how to promulgate a 
regulation.122 Before an agency issues a significant regulatory action, it 
must assess the anticipated benefits (including economic, health, 
environmental, and social benefits) and anticipated costs (including 
administrative, economic, health, environmental, and social costs) of 
the regulation.123 Both Congress and the President have increasingly 
asked for cost-benefit analysis from agencies, and courts have, with 
increasing consistency, encouraged the initiative.124 Arguably, cost-
benefit analysis is just another tool of statutory interpretation that 
happens to be designed for agencies: cost-benefit analysis can help an 
agency determine what is “appropriate and necessary,”125 what is 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate,”126 or what it means for 
technology to be the “best” or “most advantageous”127 according to the 
agency’s organic statute. For example, it is estimated that the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) regulation on 
passive restraints (or seatbelts), around the time of its enactment, cost 
three hundred dollars for every life saved and saved 1,850 lives 
annually.128 The Supreme Court determined that, given the data 
surrounding the costs and benefits of the regulation on seatbelts, 
NHTSA’s rescission of the regulation was “arbitrary and capricious.”129 
One of many potential justifications for using cost-benefit 
analysis as an interpretive tool is that cost-benefit analysis can help 
overcome cognitive biases.130 For example, due to media attention or 
current events, a particular risk may get overblown attention among 
the public.131 Conversely, the public may underestimate or overlook a 
higher, more problematic risk.132 Through quantitative and technical 
evaluation, cost-benefit analysis can help correct the cognitive biases 
that misestimate certain risks.133 Similarly, cost-benefit analysis can 
help prevent emotions or hysteria from entering into interpretation of 
 
 122. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative 
Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 323 (2001). 
 123. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 124. See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 324. 
 125. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708–09 (2015). 
 126. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 
642–44 (1980). 
 127. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009). 
 128. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 REGULATION 25, 30 (1986).  
 129. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 
52 (1983). 
 130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUDS. 1059,  
1060 (2000). 
 131. See id. at 1066–67. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
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a legal text.134 Although critics may argue that cost-benefit analysis 
lacks precision or accuracy,135 it is still a pragmatic tool to provide 
additional information to other qualitative assessments.136 
WordNet and its associated algorithms may also help overcome 
cognitive biases in legal analysis. For example, a judge’s cognitive 
perception of a word may differ from the general public’s perception of 
the word, and the judge may misapply the word more narrowly or more 
broadly than other legal practitioners or ordinary people would.137 
Applying the algorithms to the words at issue would ensure greater 
consistency across the legal field, as a judge would be less likely to 
manipulate or pervert the level of semantic relatedness between two 
terms according to his or her subjective preferences. Furthermore, the 
particular facts and circumstances of a case may cause emotions to 
distort a judge’s application of the law.138 Using the algorithms would 
mitigate the effects of emotions on the judge’s ruling, as the  
algorithms provide a more objective view into words’ meanings and 
semantic relatedness.  
More broadly, none of the analogous tools discussed in this 
Section (dictionaries, etymology, the last antecedent rule, and cost-
benefit analysis) are intended to apply in isolation from other tools.139 
Similarly, the algorithms should not be the sole deciding factor in cases 
involving interpretation of legal texts, and judges may choose to 
rightfully disregard algorithmic outcomes in favor of findings from 
other textual tools. For example, disregarding algorithms in favor of 
other interpretational tools may be justified if the algorithm’s results 
are ambiguous, the algorithm leads to absurd results, all other textual 
 
 134. See id. at 1071. 
 135. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981,  
1984 (1998). 
 136. See Sunstein, supra note 130, at 1077 (“[Cost-benefit analysis] is best taken as pragmatic 
instrument, agnostic on the deep issues and designed to assist people in making complex 
judgments where multiple goods are involved.”). 
 137. See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in 
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1294 (2008) (“[A] judge may consider language 
to be plain when in fact different people do not understand it the same way, and this may happen 
even when the judge’s understanding is shared only by a minority of people in general.”). 
 138. See Laura E. Little, Adjudication and Emotion, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 205, 212–15 (2002) 
(arguing that the emotions envy and jealousy threaten the impartiality and competence of judges). 
But see Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
629, 633 (2011) (arguing that the cultural script lauding judicial dispassion is both unrealistic and 
detrimental to good judging). 
 139. See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 754–55 (2015) (deciding that cost is one of multiple 
relevant factors an agency should consider based on its statute); Muscarello v. United States, 524 
U.S. 125, 128–30 (1998) (listing etymology as one source of support among many others, such as 
modern dictionary definitions and common usages); Kimble, supra note 116, at 23 (finding that in 
the vast majority of cases, the last antecedent rule was used as a supporting reason—not the main 
reason—for  interpreting the statute in a certain way). 
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tools come out the other way, or legislative history clearly and 
uniformly points in another direction. Nonetheless, the algorithms can 
still help inform legal analysis by fulfilling the underlying justifications 
of other more well-established legal analysis tools: WordNet and its 
associated algorithms describe obscure semantic nuances, objectively 
resolve ambiguity, and help overcome cognitive biases. Accordingly, the 
legal field should incorporate WordNet and the algorithms as additional 
textual tools in its analysis of legal texts. 
III. CASE STUDY: IS HOLDING A PERSON AT GUNPOINT AND DIRECTING 
THE PERSON NOT TO MOVE “PHYSICALLY RESTRAINING” THE PERSON? 
This case study further illustrates how useful computational 
semantic tools can be in legal analysis. Federal circuits currently split 
in their interpretation of federal sentencing guidelines in terms of 
whether pointing a gun at a person qualifies as physically restraining 
the person. Section III.A provides more details on the circuit split, 
including how traditional legal tools of interpretation preserve the 
ambiguity. Section III.B applies WordNet and the algorithms to help 
resolve the split. 
A. Introducing the Circuit Split 
Michael Anglin entered a bank in New York, gun in his hands.140 
He ordered two bank tellers to get down on the floor and not to look at 
him, thrusting the gun in one teller’s face for about fifteen seconds.141 
At a bank in South Carolina, Elianer Dimache also pointed a gun at 
three bank tellers, ordering one to empty her cash drawer and two 
others to get on the floor and be quiet.142 Both Anglin and Dimache 
followed the archetype of an armed bank robbery, as they brandished 
guns and ordered tellers about.143 Both Anglin and Dimache were 
convicted of armed robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113.144 Nonetheless, 
 
 140. United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 157 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 141. Id. 
 142. United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 143. Id.; Anglin, 169 F.3d at 157. 
 144. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 604; Anglin, 169 F.3d at 156.  
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Anglin and Dimache received disparate treatment under federal 
sentencing guidelines for roughly the same actions.145 
In the federal sentencing guideline for robbery, “if any person 
was physically restrained in order to facilitate commission of the offense 
or to facilitate escape,” the sentence should be increased by two levels.146 
Another guideline for victim-related adjustments contains similar 
language: “[I]f a victim was physically restrained in the course of an 
offense, increase by [two] levels.”147 The commentary to the federal 
sentencing guidelines defines “physically restrained” as “the forcible 
restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.”148 
Judges are obligated to consider these guidelines as a preliminary 
benchmark when issuing sentencing orders, but the guidelines are 
advisory, rather than mandatory, in nature.149 
The First, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
indicated that brandishing a gun and telling someone not to move 
qualifies as physically restraining the victim.150 On the other hand, the 
Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have decided that 
threatening a victim with a gun is not a physical restraint under the 
guidelines.151 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have switched positions 
over time.152 The Third and Eighth Circuits apply the enhancement in 
 
 145. Compare Dimache, 665 F.3d at 604 (affirming the application of a sentencing 
enhancement), with Anglin, 169 F.3d at 156, 163 (vacating a sentence for resentencing on the 
grounds of misapplication of the sentencing enhancement). 
 146. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 147. Id. § 3A1.3. 
 148. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L). 
 149. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (providing factors to be considered in imposing a sentence); Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47–50, 56 (2007) (establishing that judges may impose sentences 
outside of the guidelines as long as it is not an abuse of a discretion); Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 350 (2007) (stating that courts will vary in their application of the sentencing guidelines); 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005) (arguing that Congress wanted to permit 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences). 
 150. United States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1049–51 (6th Cir. 2012); Dimache, 665 F.3d at 
604–05; United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wallace, 
461 F.3d 15, 33–35 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Wilson, 198 F.3d 467, 471–72 (4th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 151. United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Parker, 
241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 
460–62 (5th Cir. 1998).  
 152. Initially, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the enhancement should apply when the 
defendant herded tellers into a bathroom with a sawed-off shotgun and violent threats, but the 
court denied application of the enhancement in all instances of “herding.” See United States v. 
Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992). Later, the court ruled that pointing a gun required 
“something more,” which could include a “sustained focus” of the defendant on the victim. See 
United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2005). Judge Posner affirmed the Carter 
approach as governing. United States v. Taylor, 620 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2010). However, the 
Seventh Circuit took a more definitive approach in the past year to align itself with other circuits 
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cases where a gun is used to herd or move a victim but not in all cases 
where a gun is pointed at a victim.153 In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied a petition for writ of certiorari to review this split.154 
Notably, these circuit courts often used the same textual tools to 
arrive at different results. For example, courts rarely employed 
dictionaries when addressing this problem, but when they did, they met 
conflicting information.155 The Sixth Circuit analyzed the meaning of 
“forcible restraint,” noting that Black’s Law Dictionary provides an 
illustrative example of holding someone at gunpoint in a robbery.156 
When the Seventh Circuit supported using this enhancement more 
frequently, it also defined “force” as encompassing “the operation of 
circumstances that permit no alternative to compliance.”157 The Second 
Circuit instead focused on defining “physical,” indicating that the 
restraint must be “of the body as opposed to the mind.”158 
All courts agreed that the list of actions contained in the 
commentary (“being bound, tied, or locked up”) was intended to be 
illustrative rather than exhaustive.159 Nonetheless, both camps 
employed the principle ejusdem generis to arrive at drastically different 
results. Ejusdem generis stands for the principle that if a legal text 
provides a list, then unlisted terms should have a similar nature for the 
provision to apply.160 Supporters of employing the sentencing 
enhancement invoked the purpose of binding, tying, or locking someone 
 
denying the use of the enhancement in this case. See Herman, 930 F.3d at 877. The Ninth Circuit 
originally ruled that no touching is required to employ this enhancement, as evidenced by the 
inclusion of “locked up” in the commentary. See United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th 
Cir. 1997). This approach was later affirmed, as threatening a victim with a gun pragmatically 
restrains the victim’s movement. See United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998). 
The Ninth Circuit then invoked the “sustained focus” standard to distinguish the cases and hold 
that pointing a gun at the victim and commanding the victim to get down did not qualify for this 
enhancement. See Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19 (arguing that the victims must be moved into a 
different room to constitute sustained focus). 
 153. See United States v. Stevens, 580 F.3d 718, 720–22 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating a key factor 
in determining physical restraint is if the victim is forced to move at gunpoint); United States v. 
Greenstein, 322 F. App’x. 259, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2009) (providing that physical restraint 
encompasses herding victims into a separate room). 
 154. Coleman v. United States, 566 U.S. 914, 914 (2012). 
 155. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 534 (positing that deciding which statute or rule 
governs the issue in the case can make all the difference). 
 156. United States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1049 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 157. Doubet, 969 F.2d at 347 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 513 (10th ed. 1981)). 
 158. United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting WEBSTER’S DELUXE 
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1353 (1979)). 
 159. E.g., United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 33 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Parker, 
241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999); Anglin, 169 F.3d at 163; United 
States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 160. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 438 (2020). 
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up: restricting movement and forcing compliance.161 Using a gun can be 
as effective at restricting someone’s movement and forcing compliance 
as using traditional forms of restraint.162  
On the other hand, courts leaning against employing the 
sentencing enhancement claimed the list invokes a requirement of 
physical contact or barrier with the victims.163 Moreover, the sentencing 
enhancement at issue focuses on the actions of the defendant, not the 
victim; the victim’s reaction to move or not to move when faced  
with a gun should not determine whether the sentencing  
enhancement applies.164 
Interestingly, also under ejusdem generis, some courts on both 
sides of the split found a need for the defendant to exert a “sustained 
focus” on the victim in order for this enhancement to apply.165 
Proponents of employing the enhancement contended that holding 
someone at gunpoint involves intense, personal interaction between the 
robber and the victim, even though there may never be any physical 
contact.166 The Ninth Circuit posited that pointing or brandishing a gun 
does not involve such intense interaction.167 
When examined as a whole, the sentencing guidelines caution 
against “double counting” the same aggravating or mitigating factors.168 
Under the guidelines for robbery, defendants may also receive 
sentencing enhancements for the discharge, use, brandishing, or 
possession of a firearm.169 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit notes 
 
 161. See Coleman, 664 F.3d at 1049–50; United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 607 (4th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34. 
 162. See Coleman, 664 F.3d at 1050; Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605 (quoting the district court, 
“[T]hat gun is, I think, just as effective, if not more effective, in restraining [the victims] as duct 
tape or some kind of twine or rope would have been as well.”); Miera, 539 F.3d at 1235–36.  
 163. E.g., United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2019); Anglin, 169 F.3d at 
164 (“[I]f § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) said only that the enhancement would apply ‘if any person was 
restrained,’ the courts would become involved in mental, moral, philosophical, even theological 
considerations, in addition to physical ones. No, the restraint must be ‘physical’ . . . .”); Drew, 200 
F.3d at 880. 
 164. See Herman, 930 F.3d at 876.  
 165. See United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Parker, 
241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 166. See Coleman, 664 F.3d at 1050 (holding the defendant exerted a “sustained focus” on the 
victim when ordering the victim to move around at gunpoint); Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34 (finding that 
a victim was physically restrained in part due to the defendant’s blocking of the victim’s path and 
aiming a gun at the victim’s face and chest at close range). But cf. Miera, 539 F.3d at 1235–36 
(determining that there is no requirement for prolonged individual interaction for this sentencing 
guideline but finding that it would be met by waving a gun around at the room). 
 167. See Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19 (reasoning that Congress must have meant for the 
enhancement to include something more than brandishing a gun because nearly all armed 
robberies include such an act). 
 168. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 169. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2). 
        
2021] MEASURING SEMANTIC RELATEDNESS 507 
that the enhancement of sentences for both brandishing a firearm and 
physically restraining a person qualifies as “double counting.”170  
The Sixth Circuit rejects this argument, holding that the  
singular action may have discrete and separate effects that warrant  
separate enhancements.171 
Identifying the intention of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 
drafting these guidelines is also murky. The Fourth Circuit posits that 
the enhancement was intended to punish the defendant for depriving a 
person of his or her ability to move.172 Other courts note that, if this 
sentencing enhancement were applied every time a defendant 
threatened someone with a firearm, every armed robbery would receive 
this enhancement.173 They therefore assert that the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission must have intended the sentencing enhancement to be 
restricted to more narrow circumstances.174 
Considered in toto, traditional tools preserve the ambiguity 
surrounding whether holding a victim at gunpoint and ordering the 
person to move or not to move qualifies as physically restraining the 
victim. Many of the tools, particularly ejusdem generis, can be employed 
to achieve opposite results. When interpreting the meaning of the 
sentencing enhancement, judges should therefore look to linguistics for 
clarity on the meaning of “restrain.” WordNet and the algorithms path, 
wup, and res help elucidate the plain meaning of the language. 
B. Applying Algorithms to the Circuit Split 
Employing the computational linguistic tools analyzed in 
Section I.B helps interpret the legal language and resolve the circuit 
split. As measured by WordNet and the algorithms path, wup, and res, 
“gun” and “firearm” are closely related enough to “restraint” to legally 
permit using the sentence enhancement.175 
First, it is important to frame the legal question in a measurable 
way. After all, legal analysis involves the matching of a real-life 
scenario with the words in a legal text, and the real-life scenario must 
 
 170. See United States v. Taylor, 620 F.3d 812, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 171. United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 172. United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 173. See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It would require a quixotic robber to display his gun, 
and then say to the tellers or bank customers, ‘this is a holdup, but feel free to move about the 
bank, and if any of you have to leave for an appointment elsewhere, that’s fine.’ ”); United States 
v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461–62 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 174. See Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19; Anglin, 169 F.3d at 165. 
 175. See infra Table 4. 
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therefore be carefully put into words first.176 In the circuit split, courts 
asked broadly whether holding a person at gunpoint and ordering the 
person not to move qualified as physical restraint.177 For the sake of 
analysis, it is helpful to have distinct words rather than entire phrases, 
as entire phrases lead to more difficult quantification and may not be 
available in WordNet.178 Accordingly, this analysis answers the 
question of whether a “gun” or “firearm” can qualify as a “restraint.” 
Admittedly, this does lend itself to some slight semantic differences, as 
the actions of pointing a gun at a person and any verbal cues given are 
potentially material to judges’ evaluation of the situation and 
interpretation of the guideline.179 At the heart of their analyses, 
however, courts are evaluating whether a gun can be used in place of a 
rope, twine, or handcuffs (which obviously qualify as restraints) in order 
to control the victim.180 
Next, the precise senses used are crucial to the analysis. In 
WordNet, the term “restraint” has six senses,181 and the sentencing 
guideline is ambiguous as to which one it supports.182 Because this 
analysis measures ISA relationships, it is most helpful to pick the sense 
that has the most hyponyms that are similar to what judges would 
think of as restraints.183 The sixth sense of “restraint” fits this criterion, 
as it contains hyponyms such as “band,” “chain,” “knot,” “lock,” “gag,” 
and “leash.”184 Therefore, this analysis uses the sixth sense of 
“restraint.” In addition, because the terms “gun” and “firearm” are 
 
 176. Cf. Solan, supra note 31, at 1072 (contending that linguistics is helpful when applying the 
law to real-life scenarios).  
 177. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text. 
 178. The phrase “hold at gunpoint” is not available on WordNet. [Hold at gunpoint], 
WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=hold+at+gunpoint&sub=Search+ 
WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h= (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/3E47-ZRWP]. 
 179. See United States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1050 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that the 
defendant’s verbal orders to walk out of his office rather than remain in place were material to the 
determination of whether the defendant restrained the victim). 
 180. See United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 605 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting the district court 
comparing the gun used to a rope or piece of twine). 
 181. In WordNet, “restraint” can mean: (1) “the act of controlling by restraining someone or 
something,” (2) “discipline in personal and social activities,” (3) “the state of being physically 
constrained,” (4) “a rule or condition that limits freedom,” (5) “lack of ornamentation,” or (6) “a 
device that retards something’s motion.” [Restraint], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb. 
princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=restraint&sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5
=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h= (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y5LG-PMW3]. 
 182. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) 
(“ ‘Physically restrained’ means the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound up, 
or locked up.”). 
 183. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation of policy exceptions under the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Section IV.B then applies the 
algorithms to the circuit split to further illustrate the semantic  
nuances of the words at issue and the potential utility of WordNet and 
the algorithms. 
A. Introducing the Circuit Split 
Under ERISA, a fiduciary has the duty to discharge a benefits 
plan in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and in 
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.204 
Plans may contain exceptions, conditions, and exemptions; for example, 
many life insurance policies pay premiums for “accidental” deaths, but 
deaths caused by “intentionally self-inflicted injury” do not qualify as 
“accidental.”205 ERISA grants beneficiaries the right to bring suits to 
enforce their plans in federal courts,206 and courts typically interpret 
plans based on federal common law.207 Federal common law currently 
dictates that courts interpret plans according to their plain meaning 
from the perspective of a reasonable layperson.208 
Federal circuits diverge as to whether the exception for deaths 
caused by “self-inflicted injury” applies to deaths caused by autoerotic 
asphyxiation.209 Autoerotic asphyxiation is “the practice of limiting the 
flow of oxygen to the brain during masturbation in an attempt to 
heighten sexual pleasure.”210 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have 
indicated that autoerotic asphyxiation qualifies as a “self-inflicted 
injury,” thereby blocking beneficiaries of the decedents from receiving 
benefits under some accidental-death plans.211 On the other hand, the 
Second and Ninth Circuits have indicated that autoerotic asphyxiation 
is not a “self-inflicted injury,” thus interpreting the plans in favor of the 
 
 204. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 
 205. See Tran v. Minn. Life Ins., 922 F.3d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 206. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 
 207. See Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1987) (describing how ERISA’s civil 
enforcement provision was based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, which provision the Supreme Court held had preemptive force that entirely 
displaced any state cause of action). 
 208. E.g., Tran, 922 F.3d at 382; Padfield v. AIG Life Ins., 290 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 209. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 386 (autoerotic asphyxiation was a self-inflicted injury); Critchlow 
v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2004) (autoerotic asphyxiation 
was not a self-inflicted injury); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1127, 1129 (autoerotic asphyxiation was not 
a self-inflicted injury); Todd v. AIG Life Ins., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995) (autoerotic 
asphyxiation was not a self-inflicted injury); Sigler v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins., 663 F.2d 49, 49–50 
(8th Cir. 1981) (autoerotic asphyxiation was a self-inflicted injury). 
 210. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1450. 
 211. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 386; Sigler, 663 F.2d at 49–50. 
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beneficiaries.212 Judges on the Ninth, Seventh, and Second Circuits 
have issued dissenting opinions.213 The Supreme Court denied review 
of the split in 2002.214 While the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on whether 
autoerotic asphyxiation is a “self-inflicted injury,” it has indicated that 
deaths caused by autoerotic asphyxiation are “accidental.”215 Even 
though not all federal circuits have directly ruled on this issue, the split 
permeates federal district courts and state courts, as well.216 Although 
the question of a death being “accidental” and the question of a death 
being caused by “self-inflicted injury” are not mutually exclusive,217 
courts tend to find that when a death is truly accidental, it is not caused 
by self-inflicted injury.218  
When deciding whether the exclusion applies, judges look to 
define a “self-inflicted injury.” If the term is defined in a plan, the judges 
will use the definition provided.219 For example, in one of its ERISA 
plans, AIG Life Insurance Company defined “injury” as “bodily injury 
caused by an accident occurring while this policy is in force as to the 
Insured Person and resulting directly and independently of all other 
causes in loss covered by this policy.”220 When the term is undefined or 
the definition leaves the ambiguity intact, courts aim to interpret the 
term from the perspective of a reasonable layperson.221 Courts may then 
use dictionaries in their analysis.222 The dissenting judge in the Ninth 
Circuit further applied elemental analysis to the “plain meaning” of the 
plan and ruled that an “intentionally self-inflicted injury” has three 
elements: (1) the act is upon oneself, (2) the act is done with an intent 
 
 212. See Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 260, 264; Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1127, 1129. 
 213. Tran, 922 F.3d at 386 (Bauer, J., dissenting); Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 265 (Van 
Graafeiland, J., dissenting); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1130 (Leavy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 214. AIG Life Ins. v. Padfield, 537 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2002). 
 215. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1452, 1459 (noting that the plan at-issue included no general 
exclusion for self-inflicted injury). 
 216. Compare Hamilton v. AIG Life Ins., 182 F. Supp. 2d 39, 49 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that 
autoerotic asphyxiation is an injury), with Bennett v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 
201, 212–13 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (positing that death by autoerotic asphyxiation may be accidental); 
compare also Conn. Gen. Life Ins. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. App. 1981) (finding under 
Texas law that autoerotic asphyxiation did not constitute self-inflicted injury), with Sims v. 
Monumental Gen. Ins., 960 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding under Louisiana law that 
autoerotic asphyxiation did constitute a self-inflicted injury). 
 217. See Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins., No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *20 (S.D. 
Ohio June 28, 2000). 
 218. See Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 260, 264; Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1127, 1129. 
 219. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1452. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 384. 
 222. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1452. 
        
514 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2:483 
to injure, and (3) an injury occurs.223 Determining that the decedent 
intended to asphyxiate himself and death did result, the judge found 
application of the exclusion appropriate.224 
According to federal common law in ERISA litigation, whether 
an act qualifies as “intentional, self-inflicted injury” or “accidental” can 
turn on the following test: (1) whether the decedent had the subjective 
intent and expectation to survive uninjured, and (2) whether that 
expectation was objectively reasonable.225 Most courts acknowledge 
that the decedents had the subjective intention to survive and were not 
suicidal.226 Courts differ, however, on how “reasonable” the expectation 
of lack of injury is. For example, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that 
even if the asphyxiation were not supposed to be lethal, a reasonable 
person would think that being partially choked was an injury.227 In 
contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits held that the decedents’ 
expectations of a lack of injury were reasonable, especially given  
that the decedents in those cases had previous experience with  
autoerotic asphyxiation.228 
Indeed, data on the dangers and prevalence of autoerotic 
asphyxiation can support either expectation. On the one hand, 
autoerotic asphyxiation is so “widely practiced” that it has “permeated 
popular culture and has become a commonplace punchline.”229 
Engaging in autoerotic asphyxiation usually has a nonfatal outcome.230 
On the other hand, autoerotic asphyxiation causes approximately one 
to two deaths per million people per year, meaning that the annual 
death toll for U.S. citizens dying from autoerotic asphyxiation numbers 
in the hundreds.231 
Further analyzing the nature of the act also yields mixed 
analysis. For example, the Second and Ninth Circuits separate the act 
of autoerotic asphyxiation from death by noting that engaging in a risky 
activity is not ipso facto injurious.232 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit 
 
 223. Padfield v. AIG Life Ins., 290 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002) (Leavy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 224. Id. at 1131. 
 225. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 385; Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 
257–58 (2d Cir. 2004); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1129. 
 226. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1126–27. 
 227. Tran, 922 F.3d at 384. 
 228. Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 260; Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1130. 
 229. Tran, 922 F.3d at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting). 
 230. See Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1125–26. 
 231. Id. at 1125 (citing Bennett v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 956 F. Supp. 201, 204 
(N.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
 232. See Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 260 (holding that ruling otherwise “tends to merge the concepts 
of intent and result”); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1129 (“[V]oluntary risky acts resulting in injury are 
not necessarily acts that result in ‘intentionally self-inflicted injury.’ ”). 
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highlights the continuity of the act and points out that there is no 
intervening cause between the decedent’s autoerotic asphyxiation and 
his death.233 
Courts’ standards of review of ERISA plans weigh in the 
disputed beneficiaries’ favor. In cases of ambiguity, courts tend to find 
in favor of the insured.234 In some jurisdictions, the insurer has the 
burden of proving that an exclusion to benefits applies, and courts read 
such exclusions narrowly.235 
In summary, courts can use the same traditional tools to support 
opposing conclusions as to whether autoerotic asphyxiation may qualify 
as an “accidental” death or as a death caused by “self-inflicted injury.” 
Traditional definitions, subjective versus objective reasoning, data, and 
causation analysis yield conflicting results. Especially given that courts 
must interpret plain language as a common layperson would,236 
linguistic tools can offer strong support in resolving the circuit split.237 
B. Applying Algorithms to the Circuit Split 
Applying the algorithms resolves the circuit split in favor of 
qualifying autoerotic asphyxiation as a “self-inflicted injury.” After 
determining the appropriate test terms, linguistic analysis shows that 
“asphyxiation” is more related to “injury” than it is to “accident.”238 This 
follows the pattern of the well-established injury of “cuts” and deviates 
from a traditional “accident,” such as a car crash.239 WordNet and its 
associated algorithms therefore once again illuminate the semantic 
nuances of the different terms. 
Unfortunately, the current configuration of WordNet does not 
permit the comparison of adjectives.240 Therefore, it is technologically 
infeasible to use the computational semantic tools to analyze whether 
autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an intentional, self-inflicted 
injury.241 Notwithstanding this limitation, initial linguistic analysis 
shows that the inability to quantify adjectives does not preclude 
 
 233. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 384. 
 234. See id. at 382; Todd v. AIG Life Ins., 47 F.3d 1448, 1452–53 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 235. See Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 256 (asserting that ambiguous terms should be construed 
against the insurer particularly when the ambiguity is found in an exclusionary clause). 
 236. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 382; Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1125. 
 237. See infra Section IV.B.   
 238. See infra Table 5. 
 239. See infra Tables 6 and 7. 
 240. See [Intentional#a#1, Autoerotic#a#1], WS4J DEMO, http://ws4jdemo.appspot.com/? 
mode=w&s1=&w1=intentional%23a%231&s2=&w2=autoerotic%23a%231 (last visited Dec. 15, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/T6PJ-PAS8] (showing a pair of adjectives is unsupported by the program). 
 241. Id. 
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application of the algorithms to this circuit split. The prefix “auto” in 
“autoerotic” is a reflexive, meaning it describes an act someone does to 
himself or herself.242 Therefore, “auto” is synonymous with “self-
inflicted.”243 Similarly, in this context, the fact that an act was “erotic” 
means that it was also largely intentional; the decedents in  
these cases intended to restrict their airflow to increase their  
sexual gratification.244 
Consequently, the remaining question is whether “asphyxiation” 
may constitute an “injury,” or whether it is more like an “accident.” As 
discussed above, these terms are not mutually exclusive,245 but when 
courts find an act to be accidental, it is usually not a self-inflicted 
injury.246 As discussed in Section III.B, choosing the senses of words to 
use in analysis can affect the outcome. This analysis uses the most 
common sense of asphyxiation—“the condition of being deprived of 
oxygen”—because the only other sense of the word prejudged that the 
act would end in death.247 Similarly, this analysis employs the first 
sense of “injury” as meaning “any physical damage to the body” because 
latter senses had fewer hyponyms and distinct connotations.248 In 
addition, the first sense of “accident” is more pertinent to this analysis 
because it has the connotation of misfortune rather than good luck.249 




 242. See Aut-, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aut- (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2J8K-NG9S].  
 243. “Self-inflicted” is defined as “inflicted or caused by oneself.” Self-inflicted, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/self-inflicted (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/XTV4-6P4V]. 
 244. See Tran v. Minn. Life Ins., 922 F.3d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 245. See Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins., No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *20 (S.D. 
Ohio June 28, 2000). 
 246. See Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(determining that decedent’s death was accidental and was not a self-inflicted injury); Padfield v. 
AIG Life Ins., 290 F.3d 1121, 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002) (indicating that voluntary acts that result 
in injury are not necessarily self-inflicted). 
 247. The other sense of “asphyxiation” was “killing by depriving of oxygen.” [Asphyxiation], 
WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=asphyxiation&sub=Search+WordNe 
t&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h=00000 (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/UGS2-T4JX]. 
 248. The second sense of “injury” had a connotation of “accident”; other senses involved 
combat, physical damage, or legal injuries. [Injury], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/ 
perl/webwn?s=injury&sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=
&o4=&h=00 (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TEK5-ZM8J]. 
 249. [Accident], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=accident&sub 
=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h= (last visited Dec. 
15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FFD6-628Y]. 
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algorithms as textual tools.266 As with the previous case study, judges 
may give special analytical weight to contextual considerations that 
tend to tip the scale in favor of the decedents. Nonetheless, the 
algorithms aid in uncovering and quantifying the semantic nuances 
present in ambiguous insurance plans, deciding cases involving 
autoerotic asphyxiation consistently across circuits, and overcoming 
potential cognitive biases in cases where the decedent may be 
particularly sympathetic or the cause of death especially taboo.267  
CONCLUSION 
The law is a profession of words, and lawyers are wordsmiths by 
trade. The common usage of textual tools to analyze legal authorities 
illustrates the importance of linguistic analysis to the law. Linguistics, 
particularly the fields of computational linguistics and semantics, can 
help shed light on the plain meaning of words. And yet, computational 
linguistic tools have so far been largely overlooked by the legal field. 
This Note seeks to correct this oversight by showing that computational 
semantic tools (WordNet and the algorithms path, wup, and res) are 
approachable, easy to use, helpful, and accurate. The tools uncover 
semantic nuances in words and objectively resolve difficult legal 
questions, blind to potential cognitive biases and context. For example, 
employing the linguistic tools to current circuit splits showed that 
firearms and guns could be used to physically restrain a person and that 
autoerotic asphyxiation was more strongly associated with injuries 
than with accidents. Although this Note limited the algorithms’ use to 
resolving two circuit splits, the possibilities for the algorithms’ further 
potential benefits in answering legal questions are endless. 
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